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. what
tind? how much?
SINCE1946, the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and other powers have been engaged
in various types of negotiations aimed at disarmament and the lessening
of the threat of war. These talks have been singularly unsuccessful,
except those leading to the Antarctica Treaty and perhaps to the stillpending nuclear test ban. The latest series of disarmament negotiations,
in the ten-power committee meeting in Geneva from March to June
1960, broke off abruptly, and the first session of the 15th U.N. General
Assembly was not able to devise new machinery to continue these
negotiations.
The reasons for the lack of progress in disarmament are multiple,
partly due to the suspicion ofURussiathat the US. wants "cdntrol and
no disarmament" and to the suspicion of the U.S. that Russia wants
"disarmament and no control." In addition, there have been deep
divisions on disarmament within U.S. govemment departments and
these have confused and weakened America's posture in these negotiations. Partly this vacillation has been due to the lack of a comprehensive
effort in the govemment even to coordinate political and military studies
for disarmament.

Comprehensive and controlled disarmament
Comprehensive disarmament would lessen the possibility of catastrophic
war. Today there is no national security and no world security. The
possibility of general nuclear war breaking out is high. No government
--certainly neither the U.S. nor the U.S.S.R.-can defend its people
from utter devastation in case of war. Present defense strategy cannot,
in the final analysis, prevent annihilation; it can only guarantee mutual
annihilation. If the goal of comprehensive disarmament were agreed
upon by the great powers and all nations, and if successive stages of
a disannarnent plan were put into effect progressively, the dangers of
nuclear war by accident, miscalculation, or design would lessen as the
stockpiles of nuclear and conventional weapons and their carriers were
reduced. Limited wars might arise during one stage or another of a
disarmament agreement, but the danger that they might escalate into
a nuclear war would be progressively diminished.
Comprehensive disarmament would make funds available for
peaceful projects. The $320 million dollars spent daily in all countries
for armament could gradually be turned to productive uses. These funds
could be used for reduction of taxes and public debt, for grave public
needs, and to speed industrialization of the underdeveloped countries.
While the initial cost of disarmament inspection systems might be large,
the savings from comprehensive disarmament would ultimately be
tremendous.
Comprehensive disarmament would lessen world tensions. Because
the arms race itself has become a major source of tensions, agreement
upon the goal of comprehensive disarmament by the U.S. and the
U.S.S.R. and significant steps toward this goal would make easier the
solution of outstanding political conflicts.
Comprehensive disarmament would heighten the opportunity for
non-military competition. In a world becoming disarmed, there would
still be severe political, economic, and ideological competition. Such
competition between the U.S.and the U.S.S.R. (or between the U.S.S.R.
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and China) would be for the allegiance of the non-aligned world and
would be waged in a manner which would be of greater benefit to the
underdeveloped nations. The weapons of the ideological struggle would
be non-military, and thus human survival would no longer be in jeopardy.
This competition would take the form of which nation can do the most
for underdeveloped areas. Thlis is the battle we should welcome and
could expect to win.

Arms control
Arms control, a term coming into increasing use, is unfortunately
capable of several definitions, with important differences. A number of
experts use the term, "arms control," to describe initial stages in a
long-range program which they hope may eventually lead to controlled
disarmament. Others use the term interchangeably with disarmament.
However, some students of the arms problem hope for the achievement
of disarmament and believe the best that can be expected is an arms
limitation scheme or partial disarmament which leaves in being at the
end of the process substantial national military forces capable of waging
war. This approach is neither a substitute for controlled disarmament
nor a practical goal. In general, "arms control" as used herein will
refer to arms limitation schemes and not comprehensive and controlled
disarmament.

Stabilized deterrent
The central arms control doctrine in the U.S. today is that of deterrence.
This is an old military concept. In essence, it is a threat to carry out
punitive measures in the event of a specific hostile action. In the nuclear
era this has become stabilized nuclear deterrence: a surprise nuclear
attack from one nation cannot prevent nuclear retaliation by the other
nation. Thus in theory the initial attack is deterred. Each side would
refrain from attack for fear of being destroyed.
If the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. each had 200-500 hidden or mobile

nuclear missiles, for example, this concept would "guarantee" that if
either country were destroyed by a surprise missile attack, there would
remain sufficient and automatic missile retaliation to destroy the other
nation. This would be accomplished by a second strike force of hidden
missile bases, roving Polaris submarines, and missile launchers mounted
on moving railway flatcars. Since the enemy nation could not locate
and knock out most of these retaliatory weapons, it would be deterred
from striking first.
Some advocates of arms control foresee a period of several years
during which a "stable" number of missiles on both sides would become
the final arbiter in international relations. Such a nuclear deterrence may
not, in this modem world, remain stabilized for long, and in any case,
it may not deter war.
A stabilized deterrent will encourage additional (Nth) powers to
develop their own independent nuclear force. France is openly trying
to acquire such a deterrent and it is reported that China is likewise doing
so. It was recently estimated that a dozen or more nations could develop
their own weapons in about six years. The greater the number of
nuclear nations, the greater the possibility of nuclear war. A multiplicity
in the possible origin of a nuclear attack and the means of delivery
would compound confusion for the nation which is automatically
geared to retaliate against only one enemy. The spread of nuclear
weapons will dilute the deterrent, and eventually nullify it. This process
is already occurring.
A stabilized deterrent will not eliminate war by accident. Although
the tendency to panic may be reduced by making the retaliatory system
more "secure," the possibility of human or mechanical error remains.
This danger will be compounded by the spread of nuclear weapons to
more and more nations. An accidental explosion during a period of
extreme tension, a malfunction of a warning system, an aggressive act
by a single officer or weapons crew, a sneak attack by a smaller nationall could trigger a chain of events leading to general nuclear war.
A stabilized deterrent will not stop the arms race. International
tensions and fears would continue to remain high without the prospect

of disarmament. Governments would feel compelled to develop new
military technology and stockpile new weapons, causing instability in
the deterrent system; therefore, one side or the other may become
convinced that it is necessary to launch a preventive or preemptive war.
A stabilized deterrent will not lessen, and may increase, the possibility of limited war. Nuclear stockpiles would not be eliminated and
bbtactical"weapons would be available for use. Since, under a stable
deterrent, "massive retaliation" cannot be successfully threatened,
"brush-fire" military adventures may be encouraged. There is ominous
further danger that a limited war can always grow into a general war.
A stabilized deterrent could be self-defeating. The probabilities of
nuclear war resulting from "bluff calling" or nuclear blackmail are
high. A country can be trapped by its own threats; if its bluff were called
and it did not_act, it would never again be listened to-it could never
again deter. If a nation carried out its threat, war would ensue. There
are grave dangers of wrongly estimating the opposing nation's moves
or intentions. Each side, equipped with an arsenal of strategies for
outwitting the other, can readily impute to the enemy the very modes
of thought that it itself has developed. The "self-fulfilling prophecy"
can produce war.
A stabilized deterrent will not stabilize ideological initiatives.
Schemes for balancing military forces can be outflanked by political
and economic strategies. The.strains thus produced can provoke military
response and upset the deterrence. Thus a stabilized deterrent could
become a new Maginot Line. Reliance on a stabilized deterrent in
preference to joining issue in the ideological battle on the political
and economic plane represents a tacit repudiation of confidence in the
ability of a free society to compete successfully with communism. In
any case, deterrence cannot prevent political revolutions.
A stabilized deterrent will be politically unacceptable to the world.
The sincerity and the peaceful intentions of the U.S. would be seriously
questioned if it should propose stabilized deterrent measures. Since
the U.N. unanimously voted for "general and complete disarmament"
in the autumn of 1959, the continued advocacy of a stabilized deterrent
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by the U.S. would be regarded as a step backward and as an effort to
stall forward motion on what most nations believe to be essential and
inevitable. Such a policy would be seen for what it is: a holding operation based upon irrational suspicion, essentially a strategy of moral
bankruptcy and defeatism. The totally cynical interpretation of the
intentions and needs of other nations which are implied in this policy
are not justified by a close study of the current political context.

Comprehensive disarmament
Disarmament, to be effective, must proceed by sequential monitored
stages down to the level of arms required to maintain order within
nations. Systems for arms limitation are -cult
to inspect, and easily
reversible. They would do little to allay fear and tension. The chances
of an arms limitation system enduring for any length of time are slight.
Also, the capability to construct weapons of mass destruction cannot
be unlearned, and other new weapons could not be "uninvented."
Further, a U.N. Peace Force could not maintain a preponderance of
power except in a disarmed world.
I;,
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U.S. proposals through June 1960 do not specifically make comprehensive disarmament their goal. However, on October 27, 1960,
Ambassador James Wadsworth stated before the U.N.: "We wish and
intend, under honest, balanced, and inspected agreements, to travel
the road of genuine disarmament all the way to the end." The U.S. has
made some generous offers regarding first step measures it regards as
negotiable immediately. These include cessation of production of fissionable materials, control and reduction of stockpiles, and monitoring
of missile firings.
The Russians have resisted any fist steps outside the framework
of a comprehensive treaty on disarmament to which the major powers
are committed. They interpret such measures as providing "inspection
without disarmament." There are indications that the U.S.S.R. is prepared to accept phased control provided there is mutual agreement on
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the goal. Chairman Khrushchev so indicated on several occasions in
the autumn of 1960. (For example, Prof. Louis Sohn attending the
Pugwash meetings of scientists in Moscow early in December, 1960,
observed that the Russians "seem willing to accept substantial controls
in a first stage if that stage includes a substantial amount of disarmament.") The U.S. should carefully explore the sincerity of these statements. There is no way of knowing how much control the Russians
will accept short of entering negotiations on a detailed, step-by-step
disarmament treaty.
In preparation for such negotiations, the U.S. needs to define clearly
what it envisages as the end goal for disarmament, how balanced and
equitable reductions can be implemented, and what technical measures
will be necessary in order to make control of each stage feasible:
control being defined as adequate inspection measures to deter evasion.
Because there will be national antagonisms and problems of justice
in a disarming world, attention and study must be given to developing
strengthened Qr new international institutions to keep the peace and
continue international efforts for justice. The organs of the U.N.legislative, judicial and punitive-must be strengthened before disarmament can be'carried to completion. The U.N. Disarmament Commission and the U.N. Secretariat itself could initiate new studies.
Heretofore U.S. studies in disarmament have been few, understaffed,
underfinanced, and uncoordinated. A new Peace Agency should be
established to conduct research into the technical and economic steps
toward disarmament, prepare proposals for negotiation, and coordinate
the views of various government agencies involved in planning for disarmament. It should be supplied with funds commensurate with the
importance of its tasks. One of the key roles of a Peace Agency should
be to plan the kind of machinery needed to settle disputes and keep
the peace in a disarmed world.

Recommendations
1. The Kennedy Administration should establish new machinery
to coordinate all official efforts to plan disarmament agreements.

2. The U.S. should adopt as its unambiguous goal comprehensive
disarmament (universal, complete, total) down to small arms
needed to maintain domestic order, provided there is phased
inspection and creation of new international institutions to
maintain peace and justice.

3. The West should launch a world-wide public education campaign on disarmament so that the chances for success of international negotiations on disarmament will be increased.
4. Concerned American organizations and individuals should coordinate efforts to launch a public education campaign on disarmament within the U.S. so that any government negotiations
will be supported by widespread public opinion.
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Here Is W h
1. Write a letter to President Kemedy in your own words urging
that the U.S. work vigorously for comprehensive and fontrolled
disarmament.

The White Nouse
Washington, D.C.
If you have time to write two additional letters with the same
rnesqe, send them to the following:
k r e t a r y Dean Rusk
hgmrtment of State

Mr. John J. Md=loy, Adviser,
Disarmament Administration
Washington 25, D. C.

2. Write lettern to both your senators (Seaate e e Building, Washington 25, D. C.) and to your c o n p m a a (House CMice Building,
Washington 25, D. C.) urging them to support the Flicies given in
this booklet. Enclose a copy of this primer.

3. Visit key leaders in your community (businessmen, educators, labor
oflcicials, etc.), talk to them about this issue and give each a copy

You Can Do

5. Discuss this b u s with your minister, priest, or rabbi and urne him
to deliver a sennon on the topic.

6. Urge appropriate education and action projects on this iasw culminating b the adopttion of a resoution in the clubs, civic associations, political parties, unions, veterans groups, and church or
synagogue to which you belong.

7. Order quantities of this primer (and companion primers on "A
Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Now" and "The Economics of Dik
armwmmt") for distribution. There is a special quantity price of
12 primus (all similar or four of each) for $1.00 postpaid.

To Keep Informed/SANE-USA
To work effectively for world peace today, concerned citizens must
be fortified with facts and figures. World peace has become a complicated study, but in our democracy the people must make the decisions
and not abdicate responsibility to any small group of policy-makers.
To keep informed about the dynamic complexities in the fields of
nuclear weapons tests, disarmament, and the economics of disarmament,
read the monthly publication, Sane-USA. You will keep up to date with
special monthly columns about developments in Washington and at
the United Nations.
An annual subscription (for 12 issues) of Sane-USA costs $2.00.
A two-year subscription is $3.75, with SO# extra per year for foreign
postage.

In Place of Folly
Norman Cousins has written a handbook for the concerned citizen
on nuclear war and what must be done if man is to survive. You will
know why Mr. Cousins is considered one of the most prophetic voices
on the world scene when you read among the eighteen chapters of
In Place Of Folly those entitled: Primer of Nuclear War, CBR and
Man, The Fallacy of the Deterrent, What About Russia, Don't Resign
from the Human Race, and Checklist of Enemies.
In Place of Folly has been widely reviewed and praised. Published
in January, 1961, it is available in the cloth bound Harper Brothers
edition for $3.00, or in the special SANE paperback edition for $1.50.

SPECIAL SUBSCRIPTION OFFER
Two-year subscription to SANE-USA........$3.75
One copy of the special SANE

Special offer ...............$4.49

NATIONAL
SANE
17 East 45th Street
New York 17, N. Y.
Please send the special d e r , for which $4.49 is enclosed. ($1 additional if
foreign postage.)
NAME.. ......................................................STREET....................................................

(please print)
CITY. ............................................... ZONE. .......STATE........................................

Make check or money order payable to National SANE.

